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Abstract 
This paper examines the demand and supply of medical services for the elderly in 
a health services system characterized by a per-month fixed copayment and a selective 
capitation fee scheme for outpatients with chronic diseases. The results indicate that the 
beneficiary, in particular the household dependent, visits a physician more frequently 
because the actual copayment decreases for the household dependent, but is nearly the 
same for the head of the household. A physician, however, provides more services to the 
beneficiary, partly because of the lowered copayment. The medical fee per visit for the 
beneficiary also increases because the physician adopts the capitation fee scheme. This 
will be selected only where capitation is more profitable than fee-for-service. As a result, 
physicians, as well as the insured, benefit from this particular health services system. 
Keywords: Capitation; Copayment; Cream skimming; Fee-for-service; Health service 
systems for the elderly 
JEL classification: I10, I11, I18 
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1. Introduction 
All Japanese are covered by the public health insurance system. In particular, 
those more than 70 years of age are eligible to benefit from a health services system for 
the elderly commencing in 1973 that encouraged the use of medical services by setting a 
very low out-of-pocket fee, or copayment. We focus on the system from 1996 to 1997 
that was characterized by a per-month fixed copayment, and a selective capitation fee 
scheme applied to patients with typical chronic diseases. The latter was introduced in 
April 1996, with the government aiming to control the total amount of medical fees with 
the capitation fee, while maintaining generous copayments. This system, however, will 
not only eventually influence patients’ incentives but also physicians’ incentives. 
Accordingly, we investigate empirically the effects the system had on the incentives for 
both the insured and physicians. 
We hypothesize that the beneficiary will have an incentive to demand more 
medical services than before since he/she has to pay a lower copayment under the per-
month fixed copayment scheme than under the proportional copayment scheme. The 
beneficiary of the system only has to pay the per-month-based fixed copayment, 
regardless of whether he or she is the head or the dependent,1 while the non-beneficiary 
has to pay a proportional fraction of the total medical fee, say, 10% for the head and 
30% for the dependent. Thus, the beneficiary bears a constant fee, regardless of the 
number of visits or the amount of medical services received in a given month. 
On the other hand, a physician will have an incentive to provide more services to 
the beneficiary because patients do not hesitate to visit a physician under the per-month 
                                                  
1 In 1997 the health services system for the elderly in Japan was reformed. A per-visit-based fixed 
copayment scheme was initially introduced on the demand side, followed in 2000 with a proportional 
copayment scheme. 
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fixed copayment scheme. Moreover, the physician may have an incentive to adopt the 
capitation fee scheme, but only where it is more profitable than fee-for-service. The 
capitation fee scheme can only be applied for typical chronic diagnoses of the elderly, 
including hypertension, diabetes and so on. Under the fee scheme, the reimbursed fee 
for physicians is fixed at some amount for one visit per month, and is only doubled for 
two or more visits. In general, since the reimbursement is constant per capita per month 
under capitation, a physician cannot receive greater reimbursement by providing more 
medical services. As a result, capitation is likely to be less profitable for physicians than 
fee-for-service, although capitation in Japan has given physicians an opportunity to 
make greater profits. 
The capitation fee scheme in the health services system for the elderly is distinct 
in that clinics are allowed to select their reimbursement scheme, that is, to select 
whether they adopt the new capitation scheme or follow the fee-for-service as before. 
Once a clinic selects capitation, all patients with typical diagnoses for which the 
capitation scheme is applicable follow the fee scheme. That is, a clinic cannot apply the 
fee schemes, whether capitation or fee-for-service, selectively patient by patient. Thus, 
only those clinics whose average per-capita per-month fee is below the capitation fee 
are willing to adopt the capitation scheme. Per-visit medical fees of the beneficiaries 
with typical diagnoses will then increase. On the other hand, the fees of patients with 
other diagnoses may also increase because a physician provides more services to the 
beneficiary under the fee-for-service with little concern for the decrease in the number 
of patient’ visits. After all, no matter which reimbursement scheme a clinic selects, the 
patient’s medical fee will increase after the patient becomes the beneficiary. 
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In order to see if a patient demands more, or if a physician provides more, medical 
services when he/she becomes the beneficiary of the health services system for the 
elderly, we use the data on claims (reseputo in Japanese) from hospitals or clinics to 
health insurance associations that provide firm-based health insurance for employees 
and their dependents. The data include the age of the insured, the number of visits and 
the medical fee per month, the copayment, and other characteristics of individuals 
relevant to our research. We also prepare individual-based data that aggregate the claim-
based data by individual. We use both the individual and claim-based datasets for 
demand- and supply-side analyses. 
It has already been examined how the insured change their demand for medical 
services with a change in the cost-sharing proportion. Long et al. (1998), for example, 
examined whether the insured increased the consumption of medical services when 
he/she prospects to be uninsured or to be covered by a less generous plan or vice versa. 
They found little evidence that people anticipate changes in their insurance status and 
arrange their health care accordingly. By way of contrast, Hurd and McGarry (1997) 
found that the elderly, who are the most heavily insured with the Medigap plans, use the 
most health care services, controlling the adverse selection problem in the purchase of 
insurance. Both these studies suggest that those insured with more generous health care 
plans may not necessarily increase their demand for medical services. Note, however, 
that they focus on the US case where public health insurance plays a relatively less 
important role than private insurance. On the other hand, associated with the effects of 
changes of the proportional copayment rates in the countries where people are covered 
by public health insurances, Chiappori et al. (1998) used French data to study the effects 
of an increase in the copayment rate on visits of patients, Cockx and Brasseur (2003) 
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used Belgium data, Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995) used German data and Yoshida and 
Takagi (2002) used Japanese data. They found the increase of copayment generally 
discouraged the demand. 
These studies, however, did not include changes in the provider’s behavior 
associated with the change in the copayment rate. This appears to be partly because it is 
difficult to separate the change in medical service provision by a physician from the 
change in patient demand due to limitations in the data employed. In our data set of 
claims, we regard the number of visits per month as a proxy for demand and the medical 
fee per visit as the proxy for supply. Since it is the physician who mainly decides the 
type and amount of treatment to be provided to a patient, he/she can control the per-visit 
medical fee. On the other hand, it is the insured who can decide how frequently he/she 
visits a physician in a month. Thus, we can distinguish between the demand-side and 
supply-side changes. 
On the supply side, many studies focus on the prices of medical services that a 
physician faces in light of the physician-induced demand hypothesis. McGuire and 
Pauly (1991) theoretically discuss both the income and substitution effects on the 
physician’s provision of medical services in response to changes in the relative prices of 
services. This is applied in empirical work by Yip (1998) that examined changes in the 
number of coronary artery bypass grafts and Gruber et al. (1999) in the use of cesarean 
delivery over the period 1988–1992. Another aspect of the demand inducement is that 
physicians will change medical service provisions in response to the demand function’s 
shift. Gruber and Owings (1996) showed that obstetricians/gynecologists deliver more 
births by the more lucrative cesarean section than by vaginal delivery in response to a 
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shift in demand caused by the decline in the fertility rate. Currie and Gruber (2001) 
suggest that physicians will change treatment depending on the generosity of the 
patient’s insurance. Accordingly, a generous health system for the elderly, on both the 
supply side and the demand side, as represented by the fixed copayment and fee-for-
service systems, may affect the physician’s provisions of medical services. 
On the other hand, the capitation fee scheme for some chronic diagnoses is 
expected to enhance the efficiency of medical service supply, while keeping the quality 
of service equal to the fee-for-service. This depends, however, on the assumption that 
patients select a provider by observing the quality of service, that prospective payment 
is decided by observing the actual treatment cost, and that treating all patients 
demanding treatment is efficient for providers, as argued by Rogerson (1994) and Ma 
(1994). When one of these assumptions is violated, a physician will accept only those 
patients whose illnesses are not severe, so that the actual cost of treatment is far below 
reimbursement. This is called cream skimming. In theory, Ellis (1998) shows that 
prospectively paid physicians provide excess services to low-severity patients and 
insufficient services to high-severity patients, even when providers compete against 
each other. From this, we can predict that allowing a physician to select capitation or 
fee-for-service will induce a physician to enjoy cream skimming in the sense that a 
physician will adopt capitation only when the average cost of treatment is below the 
prospective payment. 
This paper’s contributions are as follows. First, we show that patients not only 
demand more medical services, but physicians also provide more services when the 
insurance copayment is reduced. Second, since the selective capitation fee scheme was 
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exploited by physicians, it has failed to control total medical fees. Section 2 explains the 
data, Section 3 shows the estimation results for the demand and supply sides, and 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The data set 
We used data on claims from 122 health insurance associations. In principle, 
people working for a large firm and their dependents are covered by the health 
insurance provided by the firm-managed health association. There were about 1800 
firm-managed health insurance associations in Japan in the second half of the 1990s. 
When the insured visits the same clinic several times in a particular month, the clinic 
sends a claim to the patient’s health insurance association for the total medical fee 
incurred in that month detailing the number of visits, the diagnoses, the kinds of 
treatment, the medical fee and the copayment. We focus on the insured that become the 
beneficiaries from April 1996 to August 1997, a period of 17 months. We also present 
the characteristics of the insured given by the associations: that is, the age, gender and 
income of the household head, including those who did not visit a clinic in the 
surveillance period. 
Note that in our data the number of dependents (or females) is larger than the 
number of household heads (or men). In general, people who retire at the designated 
retirement age (mostly 60 years of age), and receive a public pension are obliged to quit 
the health insurance association they belonged to and join the municipality-managed 
National Health Insurance. The proportion of the elderly who are still involved in a 
firm-managed health insurance association after 70 years of age is therefore not high. So 
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the elderly in our data are those who still work for a company, even if they are more 
than 70 years old, or are dependents of children or relatives covered by firm-managed 
health insurance. If a retired person receives only the minimum public pension, he or 
she can be certified as a dependent of a son or daughter, and will thus be covered by 
firm-managed health insurance. The latter seems to be typical for dependents in our 
data.2
We construct two data sets in this study. One is individual based and the other is 
claim based. On the demand side, we use the individual-based data to examine whether 
or not the insured will be more likely to visit a physician after becoming a beneficiary of 
the health services system for the elderly due to a reduction in out-of-pocket payments. 
The claim-based data are used to determine whether the number of claims and/or per-
claim visits increase. On the supply side, we can find with the individual-based data 
whether the per-visit medical fee for a patient on average increases when a physician 
adopts the capitation fee scheme, while the claim-based data allows us to ascertain 
whether a physician provides more medical services to patients of the beneficiary. 
 
3. The estimation results 
3.1 Estimation results on the demand side 
We adopt the per-day probability to visit a doctor as our measure of patient 
demand for medical services using the individual-based data. We are concerned with 
whether the insured will increase demand for medical services when they become a 
                                                  
2 This restriction of the data may or may not affect the results, but the magnitude will not be large even if 
it does since we use information on possible medical service demand factors for patients, mainly 
household income, and control for them in our study. 
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beneficiary. Since the lengths of the two periods, being a beneficiary or a non-
beneficiary, differ across the individuals in our data, we cannot directly compare the 
number of visits between the two periods, although it is often used as a measure of 
demand. Thus, we use the ratio of the number of visits to the total number of days: that 
is, the number of total visits in the beneficiary or non-beneficiary periods divided by the 
number of days in the period, namely, 30 days times the total number of months in the 
periods.3 This measure is then regarded as the per-day probability of visiting a doctor. 
 
3.1.1. Data description and estimation results with the individual-based data 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the demand-side variables in the 
individual-based data. The sample size is 1965, and the proportion of the number of 
heads and dependents is 16% and 84%, respectively. The proportion of males is 27%. 
The average length of the periods is about 8.5 months for both the beneficiary and the 
non-beneficiary periods and their standard deviations are also nearly equal. The ‘zero-
excluded’ column focuses on the 1585 patients (or about 81% of the total number 
insured) who visit a physician at least once in each period. Most of the patients in the 
zero-excluded column are regarded as patients suffering from chronic disease. 
First, we clarify how we will evaluate the actual cost of medical services that 
patients must pay out of their pockets in order to see if the insured increase their 
demand for health service with respect to the decrease in the actual cost. Before the 
insured are 70 years old, in principle they have to pay the proportional copayment, say 
10% for the head and 30% for the dependent, for the total medical fee. But there is a 
                                                  
3 Note that we set 30 days in a month because the data do not specify on which days a hospital or a clinic is closed 
and these differ among hospitals or clinics and by month. 
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three-level financial support scheme for heavy users of medical services: a high-cost 
medical care benefit provided by the central government, a public expense provided by 
local governments, and an additional benefit from the health insurance associations. 
With a high-cost medical care benefit, the surplus copayment over the threshold 
copayment per month is reimbursed to the insured. Local government support is given 
to low-income households, the physically or mentally handicapped, and infants. So the 
actual copayment (AC) or actual copayment rate (ACR) is the nominal copayment less 
the benefits or the actual copayment divided by the per-month total medical fee, 
respectively. 
Now let us compare the change in the out-of-pocket fees of the insured with the 
actual copayment or actual copayment rate. We can see that both AC and ACR decrease 
more for the dependent than they decrease for the head. The AC and ACR of the 
dependents decrease from 17.63% to 8.67% or from 2191 yen to 1013 yen after 
becoming the beneficiary, respectively, while those of the head change slightly from 
8.96% to 10.04% and from 1162 yen to 1018 yen, respectively. The findings about the 
AC and ACR are consistent with the findings on the per-day probability of a visit. The 
head does not increase visits because his/her actual copayment rate becomes slightly 
higher, while the dependent increases visits because his/her actual copayment rate is 
lowered. 
The zero ratios are the proportion of the insured who never visit a doctor in the 
beneficiary or non-beneficiary periods. The ratio is 12.6% in the non-beneficiary period 
in total, but decreases to 9.7% in the beneficiary period. In more detail, the ratio for the 
dependent decreases while that for the head is unchanged. This implies that the insured, 
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particularly dependents, are more likely to visit a doctor after becoming a beneficiary. 
Figure 1 uses patient data to depict both the head’s and dependent’s density 
functions of the per-day probability of visiting a physician at least once in both the 
beneficiary and non-beneficiary periods. We find that the dependent’s density function 
for the non-beneficiary period shifts to the right, although the head’s function does not 
change as much. In particular, the peak of the dependent’s density moves from 0.05 in 
the non-beneficiary period to 0.08 in the beneficiary period. This implies that 
dependents who visit less than twice a month in the non-beneficiary period subsequently 
increased their visits. 
Nineteen representative diagnoses are selected from those described in the claims 
as the dummy variables in the estimation.4 More than 60% of the patients are covered 
by these diagnoses. The most frequent diagnosis is hypertension, covering 22% of non-
beneficiaries and 20% of beneficiaries. The remaining diagnoses only cover between 
2% and 4% of diagnoses. We select renal failure for one of the representative diagnoses 
because the medical fee per visit is extraordinarily high compared with other diagnoses, 
although the proportion of renal failure is only 0.1%. 
We examine if the insured increase their demand for medical services using two 
approaches. The first approach is to examine whether the insured with no visits in the 
non-beneficiary period now visit or still do not visit a physician, or whether those 
insured who have visited a physician do or do not cease visiting a physician when they 
                                                  
4 The diagnoses are: 1) diabetes mellitus; 2) endocrine, nutritional and metabolic disorders; 3) disorders of the eyes; 
4) cataract; 5) hypertensive disease; 6) ischemic heart diseases; 7) occlusion of precerebral and cerebral arteries; 8) 
gastric and duodenal ulcer; 9) gastritis and duodenitis; 10) liver diseases; 11) dermatitis; 12) inflammatory 
polyarthropathies; 13) arthrosis; 14) spondylopathies; 15) low back pain and sciatica; 16) disorders of bone density 
and structure; 17) renal failure; 18) symptoms, signs and abnormal clinical and laboratory findings not elsewhere 
classified; 19) injury, poisoning and certain other consequences of external causes. In the claims, more than one 
diagnosis is often described in a sequential order. We take the diagnosis at the top of the sequence as the diagnosis of 
the claim because it is often the patient’s main disease. 
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become beneficiaries. Then there are four cases that relate to visiting or not visiting a 
physician in the non-beneficiary period or in the beneficiary period. Most of the insured, 
that is, about 81% or 1585 of the 1965 insured, belong to the case of visiting in both 
periods, while only 3% belong to the case of no visit in either period. We employ a 
random-effects panel Probit model for the analysis that captures the individual 
heterogeneity as random effects in the non-beneficiary and the beneficiary period for 
each individual. 
The second approach is to examine whether the insured who visit a physician in 
both periods increase the per-day probability of a visit using quartile regression as well 
as least squares. We are interested in the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on 
the quartile of the per-day probability of a visit, say 25th percentile, median and 75th 
percentile, as well as the effects on the mean, because the distribution of the per-day 
probability of a visit, as shown in Figure 1, is not symmetric but rather is skewed. 
In estimating the Probit model, the effects of becoming the beneficiary to the visit 
is captured by the parameters of the cross-products of the beneficiary length, that is the 
number of months in the period, and the head or the dependent dummies. The reason to 
incorporate such cross-products is that we need to deal with the following problems. 
The first is that it depends on the length of the periods whether or not an individual 
visits a physician, since the lengths of the non-beneficiary and the beneficiary periods 
differ by individual in our data set. The longer the length, the more the individual is 
likely to visit a physician, assuming the probability of a visit is the same in each month.5 
The second is that the effects of the elderly heath care systems on the probability of 
                                                  
5 Let us examine the simple case where the probability of a visit per month is 0.1. When the period is two months, the 
probability of at-least-one visit is (1 – 0.1) × 0.1 + 0.1 × (1 – 0.1) + 0.1 × 0.1 = 0.19, which is larger than 0.1 
which is the probability when the surveillance period is one month.  
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visits are different between the head and the dependent because the dependent’s actual 
copayment rate decreases more drastically than the head. So we incorporate two types 
of cross-products: one is the cross-product of the insurance status dummy (the head or 
the dependent) and the lengths of the periods both for the non-beneficiary and the 
beneficiary periods; the other is the cross-product of the insurance status dummy and 
only the lengths of the beneficiary period, that is the cross-products take a value of zero 
in the non-beneficiary period. To make the idea clearer, we explain it with the following 
equation: 
   (1) 
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observe the insured visits to a physician. 
* 0itY >
The estimated parameters of the first cross-products, that is the second term of the 
right-hand side of Eq. (1), , mean the average effects of the amount by which 
the probability of a visit increases for both periods and whether or not the effects are 
different between the head and the dependent, if the length becomes marginally one 
month longer. On the other hand, the estimated parameters of the second cross-products, 
2 (2 1)×β
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3 (2 1)×β , mean the amount by which the probability of a visit further increases on the 
first cross-products, if the length of the beneficiary period becomes marginally one 
month longer. The estimation results in Table 2 show the parameters of the cross-
products for the length of the beneficiary period. Since the dependent dummy is 
significantly positive, this implies that the dependent is more likely to visit a physician 
when she or he becomes the beneficiary, while the head does not. 
Other than the cross-products, the remaining explanatory variables, , are a 
gender dummy (male = 1), head’s income, and the constant term. The estimated 
parameter of the gender dummy is not statistically significant, but income is positively 
significant. The marginal effect of income is about 0.008, which implies that a 100,000 
yen (nearly $US900) increase in per-month income increases the probability of a visit 
by 0.8%. 
itx
Table 2 also shows the results of the quartile and median regressions, as well as 
OLS, using the data on the insured who visit a physician at least once in both periods. In 
this estimation, the demand-side effects of becoming a beneficiary are captured mainly 
by the cross-products of the beneficiary dummy, which takes a value of 1 if the insured 
is the beneficiary, otherwise 0, and the head or dependent dummies. The cross-products 
of the beneficiary dummy and the diagnosis dummy are included in the estimated model, 
but the estimation results are omitted from the table. The estimates of the cross-products 
are positive but insignificant for the dependent in all regressions, while being 
insignificantly positive for the head in the 75th percentile regression and insignificantly 
negative in the other regressions. Although Figure 1 appears to show that the dependent 
of a beneficiary visits a physician more frequently than before, the quartile and OLS 
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regressions results do not reinforce this fact. So we cannot say that the dependent 
visiting a physician in both periods significantly increases his or her visits after 
becoming a beneficiary. 
 
3.1.2. Data description and estimation results with the claim-based data 
With the claim-based data, we can examine whether per-month visits increase in 
the beneficiary period. Since the amount of per-month copayment is fixed when the 
insured becomes the beneficiary, the insured may have an incentive to visit a physician 
more than before so that the per-month visits may increase. We construct two data sets 
for this analysis. The first consists of all 37,482 claims, and the other of the claims of 
patients visiting in both periods (35,485 claims). The descriptive statistics of the 
variables of interest in the latter are shown in Table 3. Note that the values in the table 
are not very different from those using the former data set. We can see that per-month 
visits increase in total from 2.476 to 2.588, that is, from 2.307 to 2.493 for the head and 
from 2.515 to 2.617 for the dependent. On the other hand, the actual copayment or 
copayment rate decreases in total from 1,932 yen to 1,013 yen or from 17.25 to 12.82, 
respectively. Out-of-pocket payments for dependents decrease, but those for the head do 
not. 
Table 3 also describes the other variables in the claim-based data. The number of 
claims in the non-beneficiary period is 17,249, while that in the beneficiary period is 
18,236, an increase of about 1000 claims. This implies that a beneficiary is likely to 
visit a physician more readily than a non-beneficiary, which is the same result as the 
panel Probit estimation results. In particular, the proportion of dependents’ claims 
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increases from 81% to 85%: this is also consistent with the earlier estimation results. 
 We estimate the number of per-month visits with a truncated Poisson regression 
model since the dependent variable is a counting variable truncated at zero. We conduct 
the estimation with both data sets described earlier. Table 4 shows the results. Note that 
the diagnosis dummies are included among the explanatory variables, but the results are 
omitted since most of the cross-products are insignificant. The estimation results for the 
cross-product of the insurance status dummies (head or dependent) and the beneficiary 
dummy show that only the dependent increases per-claim visits in the case of all claims. 
On the other hand, the parameter for the dependent is negative but insignificant in the 
case of the claims of patients visiting in both periods. However, the negative value of 
the dependent’s parameter does not necessarily contradict the results of Table 2 or the 
data description of Table 1. These results show that only per-claim visits decrease. Since 
the dependent increases the number of claims, the per-capita average per-month visits 
increase. This is also true for the head. The number of the head’s claims also slightly 
increase so that the head may not change the per-capita average per-month visits, 
although the parameter of the cross-product is significantly negative. Moreover, 
considering the results of the two cases together, we find that dependents who visits a 
physician only in the beneficiary period tend to visit more frequently than those who 
visit in both periods. This may be because the former is encouraged to visit a physician 
by the lower medical fee so that he/she visits more frequently than the latter with 
chronic disease whose visits are controlled by a physician, with required regular visits in 
both periods. One possible reason is the capitation fee scheme, given that the cost of the 
third and later visits are not reimbursed to physicians. 
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In sum, from the estimation results of the individual-based and the claim-based 
data, we find that it is easier for the insured to visit a physician when he/she becomes a 
beneficiary of the health service system for the elderly. In particular, the dependent is 
likely to visit a physician more frequently, while the head does not change the number 
of visits. 
 
3.2 Estimation results of the supply side 
We adopt two approaches to examine if a physician changes the quantity of 
medical services provided when a patient becomes a beneficiary. The first compares the 
distributions of the per-visit fee between the beneficiary and non-beneficiary periods 
using the claim-based data. The second compares the distributions of the per-visit fee 
among the beneficiaries of the diagnoses to which the capitation fee scheme is 
applicable using the individual-based data. Note that the data set of the second approach 
comprises the insured who visit a physician at least once in both periods. In the first 
approach, we examine if the distributions of the per-visit fee differ between the 
beneficiary and the non-beneficiary to see if a physician provides more services to the 
beneficiary. In the second approach, we examine if the increase in the per-visit fee to the 
beneficiary to whom the capitation is applicable is larger than it is to the beneficiary 
without diagnosis. If so, a physician whose average cost of patients is lower than the 
capitation reimbursement will adopt the capitation fee scheme. 
 
3.2.1. Estimation results with the claim-based data 
We employ quantile regression methods, median regression, 25th percentile and 
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75th percentile regressions, as well as OLS, to examine in which fee groups of patients 
or in what types of patient diagnoses a physician changes the quantity of medical 
services. 
The explanatory variables are classified into five categories. The first is the 
dummies for gender, insurance status (head or dependent), financial support by the 
government or by a health insurance association. The second is the treatment length of 
the diagnosis on the claim, that is, the number of years from the first visit for the 
diagnosis to the latest visit. The third is the 19 diagnoses dummies as well as the 
analyses in section 3.1. The fourth consists of the cross-products of the beneficiary 
dummy and the first, second and third variables except for the gender dummy. The fifth 
category is the lengths until the patient turns 70 years old or those past 70 years 
measured by the number of months. The financial support dummies consist of a high-
cost medical care benefit dummy, an additional benefit dummy, and a public expense 
dummy. The dummies for the treatment length of the diagnosis are the first-visit dummy, 
no-more-than-5-year dummy, no-more-than-10-year dummy, and more-than-10-year 
dummy.6 We expect that a patient with longer treatment years has a chronic disease and 
thus their per-visit fees will increase when they are the beneficiary, partly because a 
physician provides more medicine or laboratory tests than before and partly because a 
physician adopts the capitation fee scheme. With the estimates of the cross-products, we 
can examine if the quantity of the service changes depending on eligibility or if the 
changes are different between the head and the dependent. We predict that the per-visit 
fee of the dependent beneficiary will increase because the actual copayment of the 
                                                  
6 In the claims, the first month to start the treatment for a specific diagnosis is described. We can then find how long a 
patient visits the same physician for the same specific diagnosis. 
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dependent decreases to nearly one half of that for the non-beneficiary. The last category 
includes the number of months until the patient turns 70 years old and those past 70 
years, ranging from one to 17. We try to capture the delaying effects such that a 
physician may provide less service for patients immediately before they are 70 years old 
and more for patients immediately after they turn 70. A physician may delay elective or 
non-urgent services, such as laboratory tests or diagnostic imaging, for these patients 
because they can receive the services with a lower fee once they become a beneficiary. 
That is, the shorter the months to (or past) 70 years, the greater the probability the 
physician may provide less (or more) services. The base case is a non-beneficiary head, 
female, with a less-than-5-year length of treatment. 
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of the per-visit fee in both the claim- and 
individual-based data. The per-visit fee in the individual-based data is 719 points for the 
non-beneficiary and 809 points for the beneficiary, respectively, or 90 points higher for 
the beneficiary.7 There is little difference in the per-visit fee between the head and the 
dependent, although the dependent visits more than the head when he/she becomes a 
beneficiary. Note that there is no high-cost medical care benefit or additional benefit for 
the beneficiary because their per-month fee is bounded below the threshold level by the 
health services system for the elderly, while some beneficiaries still have some public 
expense. Excluding the data where patients are financially supported, the per-visit fee 
increases about 100 to 150 points when a patient becomes the beneficiary. For the 
length of treatment, the results indicate that the longer the treatment length, the larger 
the per-visit fee. In particular, the per-visit fee of patients, except first-visit patients, 
                                                  
7 The total fee is calculated based on the fee schedule, where medical services are disaggregated down to the finest 
detail and some points are attributed to a unit of each item, where one point is valued at 10 yen in the case of the fee-
for-service schedule. 
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increases more than the first-visit patients when they become beneficiaries. 
Table 6 presents the regression results. Let us see if the per-visit fee increases 
when a patient becomes the beneficiary using the median regression. The regression 
estimates relevant to the diagnosis dummies are omitted in the table. The estimated 
parameters of the cross-products show that the per-visit fee of the head and the 
dependent are 87 points and 164 points larger than the base case, respectively. Even if 
we take the estimated parameters of the diagnosis dummies into consideration, ranging 
from –113 to 138 points except for renal failure,8 the per-visit fee of the head increases 
for many diagnoses or is unchanged for some diagnoses, while the fee for the dependent 
increases for all diagnoses. The 25th percentile and the 75th percentile regressions as 
well as OLS show the same results as the median regression. In particular, the increase 
in the per-visit fee of the dependent is larger than that for the head. Thus, we can 
conclude that a physician provides more medical services both to the dependent and to 
the head when they become beneficiaries, but the increase for the dependent is larger 
than for the head. This can be explained by the lower copayment for dependents. 
The estimation results of the cross-products of the length of treatment and the 
beneficiary dummy show that a physician increases the per-visit fee of patients of 
chronic diseases when their per-visit fee is relatively lower before they turn 70. The 
estimates of the more-than-10-year treatment length are significantly positive in the 
25th percentile and median regression but insignificant in the 75th percentile regression 
and in the OLS. This may indicate that a physician applies the capitation fee scheme 
only for patients with lower per-visit fees. 
                                                  
8 The fee for renal failure increases by 2,358 points per visit. This may reflect the use of dialysis therapy by the 
beneficiary. 
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Figure 2 depicts the probability density functions of the per-visit fee for both the 
head and the dependent in the beneficiary and non-beneficiary periods. We can easily 
observe two points with the density functions: first, the peaks of the density functions 
around 400 points move downward for both the head and the dependent; second, there 
is a ‘bump’ around 900 points, in particular in the dependent’s density function of the 
beneficiary. The shapes of the distribution functions suggest that the capitation fee 
scheme is adopted by physicians whose patients pay a lower fee when they are the non-
beneficiary, and thus adoption makes the bump in the distribution in the beneficiary 
period. 
The number of months to 70 years is significantly negative in the 75th percentile 
regression and in the OLS, while the number of months past 70 years is significantly 
positive in the 25th percentile regression and in the OLS, but the values are small so that 
their effect on the per-visit fee is negligible. 
From the above results we can conclude as follows. First, physicians increase the 
per-visit fee for beneficiary patients because their copayment is lowered, which is 
supported by the fact that the increase in the fee of the dependent is larger than the head 
and that the copayment of the dependent is significantly less than that of the head. 
Second, physicians appear to adopt the capitation fee scheme when the average per-visit 
fee of their patients is lower. 
 
3.2.2. Estimation results with the individual-based data 
Using the individual-based data, we also examine if a physician provides more 
medical services to the patients of the beneficiary or if a physician adopts the capitation 
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for their own benefit. As both the estimation results with the claim-based data and 
Figure 2 show, the increase in the per-visit fee is likely to be caused by a decrease in 
copayment as well as the adoption of the capitation fee scheme. 
We first, however, briefly explain the capitation fee scheme. This scheme was 
introduced in 1996, was slightly changed in April 1997, and was ultimately abolished in 
2002. Its purpose was to reduce the expenditure on medical services by elderly patients 
by directing patients with representative chronic diseases to receive treatment from a 
hospital rather than a clinic. The medical fee claimed by a hospital was, in fact, higher 
than by a clinic under the fee-for-service scheme. The government also aimed to 
discriminate between providers of medical services for acute and chronic diseases—in 
principle, the former being hospitals and the latter clinics—for the purpose of the 
socially efficient allocation of medical resources without the introduction of a 
gatekeeper system. Thus, the government introduced the capitation fee scheme for 
clinics, while slashing fees for hospitals. It was expected that clinics were willing to 
treat elderly patients when offered a generous capitation fee, and that this would reduce 
total medical fees for the elderly. 
The fee scheme before the minor reform of 1997 was as follows. In principle, the 
per-month fee was 1,470 points for clinics without medicine prescriptions and 1,770 
points for clinics with medicine prescriptions. Additional fees were allowed to be 
claimed, but this amount was relatively small so that the total fee per month was around 
1,470 to 1,770 points. To use this fee scheme, a physician needed to see a patient at least 
twice a month. Thus, the per-visit fee was around 735 or 885 points and smaller if a 
patient visited more than twice a month. A physician then had an incentive to see a 
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patient twice a month. After the changes in 1997, the physician could use the fee 
scheme even if the patient visited only once a month. The per-visit fee remained the 
same, 735 or 885 points, and the upper limit was set at 1,470 or 1,770 points. Thus, the 
change meant that a physician could easily use the fee scheme. In other words, the 
physician did not have to induce a patient to visit twice a month. 
Our data are collected from claims made 17 months before September 1997 so 
include the period before and after the minor reform of the capitation fee scheme. Since 
the length of months after the change is not long (about four months), and the per-visit 
fee on which we focus is unchanged, the minor reform in April 1997 has no significant 
influence on the results of the supply-side studies. 
 Table 7 shows the estimation results of the per-visit medical fee with the 
individual-based data. Because there are some difficulties in identifying exactly to 
which patients the capitation is applied, since there is no record of the fee scheme on the 
claim data used, we use the information on diseases in the claims. We use three types of 
data set: the first includes all samples (named ALL SAMPLES), the second is a subset 
of the individuals who have one of the diagnoses for which the capitation is applicable 
described on their claims both in the non-beneficiary and in the beneficiary periods 
(named CAPITATION APPLICABLE,9) and the third is a subset of individuals who had 
no diagnoses under the capitation scheme (named FEE-FOR-SERVICE). 
From the results with ALL SAMPLES, we find that the per-visit fee of the head 
and the dependent increase when they are beneficiaries. In particular, the per-visit fee of 
                                                  
9 The CAPITATION APPLICABLE data set may in fact include individuals to whom the capitation fee scheme was 
not applied, but we do not think the portion is large. The reasons are: 1) an elderly person with a chronic diagnosis 
regularly seeing a physician may merely visit a hospital, and 2) most clinics adopt the capitation fee scheme because 
the reimbursement is so generous. 
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the dependent increases more than for the head. This is the same as the results with the 
claim-based data: a physician provides more medical services for the beneficiary, in 
particular for the dependent. 
Next we will compare the results from the datasets of CAPITATION 
APPLICABLE and FEE-FOR-SERVICE. In the former, the estimates of the cross-
products are significantly positive in most regressions except for the dependent in the 
75th percentile regression. The values of the estimates of the cross-products of the head 
in CAPITATION APPLICABLE are nearly the same as the dependent in the 25th 
percentile regression and in the OLS, and are larger than the dependent in the median 
and in 25th percentile regressions. On the other hand, the estimates of the head of cross-
products in the FEE-FOR-SERVICE data set are not significant, but those of the 
dependent are positively significant in all of the regressions. The differences in the 
results suggest that there must be some source raising the fee of the head with 
CAPITATION APPLICABLE, which is different from a reduction in the copayment. 
This source must be the capitation fee scheme. On the other hand, the effects of the 
copayment reduction on the medical service provisions are expressed in the 
significantly positive estimates of the dependent of the cross-product in FEE-FOR-
SERVICE. 
Figure 3 and 4 also support the facts derived by the regressions in Table 7. Figure 
3 depicts the density functions of per-visit points of FEE-FOR-SERVICE by insurance 
status, namely the head or the dependent, while Figure 4 depicts those of CAPITATION 
APPLICABLE. In Figure 4, the peaks of the densities of the head and dependent shift to 
the right by around 700 points for the dependent and around 900 points for the head. On 
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the other hand, the peaks in Figure 3 do not change as much, although the density of the 
dependent shifts to the right. This is consistent with the regression results in Table 7. 
Thus, the shifts of the densities in Figure 4 are explained mainly by the adoption of the 
capitation fee scheme. 
In total, we can first conclude that a physician provides more medical services to 
patients, in particular to the dependent, since the dependent’s copayment is lowered 
more than is the head's when they become eligible for the health service systems for the 
elderly. Second, the per-visit fee of patients increases partly because a physician adopts 
capitation if it will increase the total reimbursement. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
We examine if insured persons demand more medical services, or if a physician 
provides more medical services, when the insured is eligible to benefit from the health 
services system for the elderly. This system is characterized by a per-month fixed 
copayment and by a selective capitation fee scheme for patients with typical chronic 
diseases. We find that the beneficiary, in particular the dependent, visits a physician 
more frequently than before because the actual copayment decreases, mainly for the 
dependent and less so for the head. On the other hand, a physician provides more to the 
beneficiary partly because of the lowered copayment. The medical fee per visit of the 
beneficiary also increases because physicians adopt the capitation fee scheme, which 
they will select instead of the fee-for-service scheme only when capitation is more 
profitable than fee-for-service. As a result, physicians as well as the insured benefit 
from the health services system. 
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One criticism of our results is that a physician who adopts the capitation fee 
scheme increases the quantity of medical services to the patient. In other words, the 
patient is provided more treatment than before so that a physician does not exploit the 
capitation fee scheme. We cannot observe if the physician has done this since there is no 
record on the claims of what types of treatments the physician provided in the case of 
capitation. A better way to examine it would be to check whether or not the per-visit fee 
decreased when the capitation fee scheme was abolished and the fee-for-service revived. 
The capitation fee scheme was abolished at the end of September 2002. The Japan 
Medical Association sent a questionnaire to its members to investigate the effects of its 
abolition and the change in the fee schedule (down 2.7% from April 2002) had on 
physicians’ income. The report compared data on claims collected from October to 
December 2001 with data collected from October to December 2002. This showed that 
per-capita fees decreased from 700.6 to 564.6 points: that is, a 19.4% decline in clinics 
adopting the capitation, while it decreased from 650.3 to 615.5 points, that is, a 5.3% 
decline, in clinics adopting fee-for-service. If the physicians who adopted the capitation 
provided as many services as the capitation fee scheme expected, the decline of the per-
capita fee should be nearly the same as physicians adopting the fee-for-service, namely 
5.3%. This difference implies that the physicians have not provided as many services as 
the capitation fee scheme expected. 
 
References 
Chiappori PA, Durand F, Geoffard PY. Moral hazard and the demand for physician 
services: First lessons from a French natural experiment. European Economic 
27
Review 1998; 42; 499–511. 
Cockx B, Brasseur C. The demand for physician services: Evidence from a natural 
experiment. Journal of Health Economics 2003; 22; 881–913. 
Currie J, Gruber J. Public health insurance and medical treatment: The equalizing 
impact of the Medicaid expansions. Journal of Public Economics 2001; 82; 63–89. 
Ellis R. Creaming, skimping and dumping: provider competition on the intensive and 
extensive margins. Journal of Health Economics 1998; 17; 537–556. 
Gruber J, Kim J, Mayzlin D. Physician fees and procedure intensity: the case of 
cesarean delivery. Journal of Health Economics 1999; 18; 473–490. 
Gruber J, Owings M. Physician financial incentives and cesarean section delivery. 
RAND Journal of Economics 1996; 27; 99–123. 
Hurd MD, McGarry K. Medical insurance and the use of health care services by the 
elderly. Journal of Health Economics 1997; 16; 129–154. 
Long SH, Marquis MS, Rodgers J. Do people shift their use of health services over time 
to take advantage of insurance? Journal of Health Economics 1998; 17; 105–115. 
Ma CA. Health care payment systems: cost and quality incentives. Journal of 
Economics and Management Strategy 1994; 3; 93–112. 
McGuire TG, Pauly MV. Physician response to fee changes with multiple payers. 
Journal of Health Economics 1991; 10; 385–410. 
Pohlmeier W, Ulrich V. An econometric model of the two-part decision-making process 
in the demand for health care. Journal of Human Resources 1995; 30; 339–61. 
Rogerson WP. Choice of treatment intensities by a nonprofit hospital under prospective 
pricing. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 1994; 3; 7–52. 
Yip CW. Physician response to Medicare fee reductions: Changes in the volume of 
28
coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgeries in the Medicare and private sectors. 
Journal of Health Economics 1998; 17; 675–699. 
Yoshida A, Takagi S. Effects of the reform of the social medical insurance system in 
Japan. The Japanese Economic Review 2002; 53; 444–465 
29
0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25 .3 .35 .4 .45 .5
per-day probability
non-beneficiary beneficiary
0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25 .3 .35 .4 .45 .5
per-day probability
non-beneficiary beneficiary
Figure 1 Density Functions of the Per day Probability of Visit: -
Head
Dependent
Individual based Data-
30
0
.0
0
0
2
.0
0
0
4
.0
0
0
6
.0
0
0
8
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
2
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
per-visit point
non-beneficiary beneficiary
0
.0
0
0
2
.0
0
0
4
.0
0
0
6
.0
0
0
8
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
2
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
per-visit point
non-beneficiary beneficiary
Figure 2: Density Functions of Per-visit Point
Claim-based Data
Head
Dependent
31
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
per-visit point
non-beneficiary beneficiary
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
per-visit point
non-beneficiary beneficiary
Figure 3 Density Functions of Per visit Point: - :
The Case of ee or Service- -F F
Dependent
Head
32
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
per-visit point
non-beneficiary beneficiary
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
per-visit point
non-beneficiary beneficiary
Figure 4 Density Functions of Per visit Point: - :
Head
Dependent
The Case of Capitation Applicable
33
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (individual-based data)
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
Head dummy 0.164 0.370 0.162 0.369 0.164 0.370 0.162 0.369
male 0.118 0.323 0.115 0.319 0.118 0.323 0.115 0.319
female 0.046 0.209 0.047 0.212 0.046 0.209 0.047 0.212
Dependent dummy 0.836 0.370 0.838 0.369 0.836 0.370 0.838 0.369
male 0.152 0.359 0.151 0.358 0.152 0.359 0.151 0.358
female 0.684 0.465 0.687 0.464 0.684 0.465 0.687 0.464
Gender dummy (male=1) 0.270 0.444 0.266 0.442 0.270 0.444 0.266 0.442
Income （100 thuosand yen） 4.439 1.773 4.512 1.809 4.494 1.776 4.570 1.816
Length of the periods (months) 8.420 4.412 8.554 4.320 8.580 4.412 8.446 4.320
Per-day probability of visit 0.091 0.110 0.110 0.114 0.099 0.112 0.118 0.114
head 0.089 0.106 0.109 0.109 0.091 0.104 0.111 0.107
dependent 0.091 0.111 0.110 0.115 0.101 0.113 0.119 0.116
Actual copayment rate (%) - - 16.22 10.52 - - 8.89 6.57
Head - - 8.96 2.33 - - 10.04 7.63
Dependent - - 17.63 10.90 - - 8.67 6.32
Per-month actual copayment - - 2024 1967 - - 1014 47
(thuosand yen) Head - - 1162 815 - - 1018 18
Dependent - - 2191 2078 - - 1013 51
Zero-ratio 0.126 0.332 - - 0.097 0.296 - -
Head 0.112 0.316 - - 0.121 0.327 - -
Dependent 0.129 0.335 - - 0.093 0.290 - -
Note (4): The‘zero-excluded’column focuses on the 1585 patients (or about 81% of the total number insured) who visit a physician at
least once in each period.
Note (2): The the actual copayment or actual copayment rate is the nominal copayment less the benefits or the actual copayment
divided by the per-month total medical fee, respectively.
Note (3): The zero ratios are the proportion of the insured who never visit a doctor in the beneficiary or non-beneficiary periods.
Note (1): The per-day probability is defined as total visits of the non-beneficiary or the beneficiary periods divided by the total
calendar days respectively.
non-beneficiary beneficiary
Total （sample：
1965）
zero-excluded
（sample：1585）
Total （sample：
1965）
zero-excluded
（sample：1585）
34
Table 2: Estimation results of the demand (individual-based data )
estimate s.e. estimate s.e. estimate s.e. estimate s.e.
Random-effects probit (sample:3930)
Dependent variable: visit=1
marginal effects
Constant 0.497 0.126 ***
Gender dummy （male＝1） -0.112 0.093 -0.011 0.00935
Income (100 thousand yen) 0.090 0.024 *** 0.008 0.00221 ***
Head 0.099 0.016 *** 0.009 0.00153 ***
Dependent 0.089 0.010 *** 0.008 0.00100 ***
Head 0.027 0.021 0.002 0.00192
Dependent 0.016 0.009 * 0.001 0.00081 *
σ 0.864 0.053 ***
ρ 0.427 0.030 ***
Log Liklihood -1254
Qurtile, Median Regressions and OLS (sample:3170)
Dependent variable: per-day probability of visit
25-% regression median regression OLS 75-% regression
Constant 3.568 0.412 *** 7.164 0.540 *** 10.910 0.739 *** 13.318 0.948 ***
Head 0.274 0.433 0.809 0.573 1.324 0.787 * 1.895 1.018 **
Gender dummy （male＝1） -0.279 0.268 -1.074 0.363 *** -1.924 0.497 *** -2.827 0.642 ***
Income (100 thousand yen) 0.106 0.059 * 0.123 0.078 0.074 0.107 0.155 0.137
Head -0.591 0.614 -0.249 0.815 -0.098 1.116 0.540 1.431
Dependent 0.599 0.418 0.593 0.556 0.774 0.759 0.286 0.992
0.1025
Pseud (or Adusted) R-squared 0.0414 0.0422 0.1025 0.0888
Note (1): The symbols, ***, ** and *, mean that the estimates are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Note (2):  The estimated parameters of the diagnoses dummies are omitted. 
Cross-products (× months of both
periods)
Cross-products (× beneficiary length)
Cross-products (× beneficiary dummy)
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics (claim-based data)
mean s.d. mean s.d.
Head 0.190 0.392 0.150 0.357
male 0.137 0.344 0.102 0.302
female 0.053 0.223 0.049 0.215
Dependent 0.810 0.392 0.850 0.357
male 0.123 0.329 0.132 0.339
female 0.687 0.464 0.717 0.450
Gender dummy (male=1) 0.260 0.439 0.234 0.423
monthly income 4.598 1.907 4.612 1.784
 （100 thuosand yen）
Number of visits Total 2.476 2.765 2.599 2.839
Head 2.307 2.430 2.493 2.827
Dependent 2.515 2.836 2.617 2.841
Actual copayment rate Total 17.25 11.21 12.82 12.96
(%) Head 9.21 2.45 14.58 14.38
Dependent 19.13 11.62 12.51 12.67
Total 1932 2047 1013 91
Head 1189 1212 1016 55
Dependent 2105 2161 1013 96
Note: The the actual copayment or actual copayment rate is the nominal copayment less the
benefits or the actual copayment divided by the per-month total medical fee, respectively.
(sample：17249) (sample：18236)
Per-month actual
copayment (Yen)
non-beneficiary beneficiary
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Table 4: Estimation results of zero-truncated Poisson regression
 (Claim-based data)
estimate s.e. marginal effect s.e.
All claims ( 37215 samples)
Constant 0.931 0.0145 ***
Income -0.011 0.0022 *** -0.022 0.0044 ***
Male dummy -0.082 0.0104 *** -0.163 0.0203 ***
Head dummy -0.098 0.0161 *** -0.192 0.0303 ***
Head -0.025 0.0195 -0.051 0.0389
Dependent 0.030 0.0141 ** 0.061 0.0289 **
Log Likelihood -72108
Pseudo R2 0.0866
Claims of the patients visiting in both periods (35485 samples)
Constant 0.941 0.0148 ***
Income -0.010 0.0022 *** -0.020 0.0044 ***
Gender dummy (Male=1) -0.073 0.0106 *** -0.146 0.0207 ***
Head dummy -0.094 0.0164 *** -0.183 0.0308 ***
Head -0.045 0.0199 ** -0.089 0.0389 **
Dependent -0.003 0.0146 -0.006 0.0295
Log Likelihood -68565
Pseudo R2 0.0889
Note (2):  The estimated parameters of the diagnoses dummies are omitted. 
Cross products ( × beneficiary
dummy)
Cross products ( × beneficiary
dummy)
Note (1): The symbols, ***, ** and *, mean that the estimates are significant at 1%, 5% and
10% significance level, respectively.
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Table 5：　Descriptive statistics of per-visit medical fee
(Claim-based data and Individual-based data)
No. of
Samples mean s.d.
No. of
Samples mean s.d.
claim-based data
Total 17249 719 716 18236 809 839
Head dummy 3269 747 895 2742 836 1088
Male 2361 767 951 1852 914 1229
Female 908 697 728 890 673 680
Dependent 13980 712 667 15494 804 787
Male 2130 856 887 2414 956 1008
Female 11850 686 616 13080 776 736
Yes 4 8071 1548 - - -
No 17245 717 707 18236 809 839
Additional benefit
Yes 1662 1328 1192 - - -
No 15587 654 610 18236 809 839
Public expence
Yes 6324 746 725 120 657 410
No 10925 703 711 18116 810 841
Length of treatment
0（first visit） 2398 744 693 2239 787 762
no more than 5 years 10674 690 739 11079 787 885
more than 5 years to 10 years 2813 751 615 3272 835 801
more than 10 years 1364 831 757 1646 930 665
individual-based data
Total 1585 706 533 1585 755 519
Head dummy 257 723 635 257 765 652
Male 182 761 704 182 825 735
Female 75 630 408 75 618 344
Dependent 1328 703 510 1328 753 489
Male 239 806 550 239 897 573
Female 1089 680 499 1089 722 463
Yes 1 8071 0 - - -
No 1584 702 500 1585 755 519
Additional benefit
Yes 406 896 746 - - -
No 1179 641 416 1585 755 519
Public expence
Yes 627 697 482 20 749 299
No 958 712 563 1565 755 522
Note: The unit value of the fees is a point that is equal to 10 yen. 
non-beneficiary beneficiary
High-cost medical care benefit
High-cost medical care benefit
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Table 6: Estimation results of per-visit medical fee (claim-based data)
Sample size: 35485
25%-regression median regression OLS 75%-regression
estimate s.e. estimate s.e. estimate s.e. estimate s.e.
Constant 194.84 7.25 *** 381.11 10.11 *** 616.49 20.31 *** 749.48 17.03 ***
Dummies
Gender　(male＝1) 28.53 3.69 *** 57.60 5.26 *** 134.29 10.57 *** 112.94 8.89 ***
Dependent 12.74 5.82 ** 8.02 8.25 -78.88 16.59 *** -53.39 14.08 ***
High-cost benefit 6822.50 126.57 *** 6550.46 160.36 *** 6839.41 371.62 *** 5911.61 299.21 ***
Additional benefit 320.89 7.23 *** 454.34 10.18 *** 709.26 20.47 *** 790.39 17.40 ***
Public expence 52.89 4.58 *** 107.51 6.41 *** 202.52 12.88 *** 176.75 10.84 ***
Length of treatment
0（first visit） 113.37 6.19 *** 96.15 8.66 *** 114.99 17.39 *** 129.14 14.74 ***
more than 5 years to 10 years 30.89 5.73 *** 15.49 8.06 * 37.34 16.20 ** 23.31 13.70 *
more than 10 years 33.39 7.77 *** 26.93 11.04 ** 59.43 22.21 *** 29.69 18.95
-0.16 0.54 0.07 0.76 -6.21 1.52 *** -4.08 1.28 ***
Cross products ( × beneficiary dummy) 
Head 49.88 9.50 *** 87.29 13.17 *** 153.49 26.47 *** 114.06 22.26 ***
Dependent 97.51 8.64 *** 163.69 12.09 *** 206.39 24.29 *** 206.88 20.41 ***
Public expence -81.77 24.64 *** -138.61 34.39 *** -350.48 69.33 *** -273.34 58.23 ***
0（first visit） -42.93 8.84 *** -25.25 12.33 ** -86.62 24.79 *** 4.62 21.04
more than 5 years to 10 years -34.98 7.86 *** -11.39 11.04 -18.45 22.19 11.56 18.81
more than 10 years 53.74 10.52 *** 81.17 14.94 *** 29.03 30.05 40.98 25.61
1.10 0.52 ** 0.60 0.72 2.49 1.45 * 1.29 1.22
Pseud (or Adusted) R-squared 0.0772 0.0775 0.1027 0.0928
Note (1): The symbols, ***, ** and *, mean that the estimates are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Note (2):  The estimated parameters of the diagnoses dummies are omitted. 
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Table 7: Estimation results of per-visit medical fee (individual-based data)
25%-regression median regression OLS 75%-regression
estimate s.e. estimate s.e. estimate s.e. estimate s.e.
Constant 332.07 19.93 *** 471.94 33.45 *** 582.82 40.22 *** 640.68 46.30 ***
Gender (male=1) 43.62 10.95 *** 80.15 18.68 *** 133.07 22.44 *** 170.60 25.98 ***
Dummies
Dependent 5.95 18.13 7.03 31.38 -32.88 37.76 13.00 43.47
High-cost benefit 7581.99 15.44 *** 7375.11 26.97 *** 7233.16 489.80 *** 7163.05 38.43 ***
Additional benefit 150.74 15.66 *** 216.67 26.76 *** 287.65 32.17 *** 254.01 37.46 ***
Public expence 43.78 14.22 *** 60.63 24.22 ** 120.19 29.19 *** 95.03 33.71 *
Head 10.11 25.29 109.13 42.47 *** 88.30 51.02 * 152.21 58.75 ***
Dependent 91.61 22.27 *** 156.81 37.78 *** 155.86 45.37 *** 213.30 53.03 ***
Public expence 54.11 55.56 -5.84 93.27 -117.40 114.24 66.05 131.86
Pseud (or Adusted) R-squared 0.068 0.074 0.139 0.098
Constant 450.85 32.94 *** 578.66 56.29 *** 630.24 60.15 *** 798.43 84.35 ***
Gender (male=1) 37.69 19.53 * 65.45 32.47 ** 91.95 34.75 *** 104.21 48.19 **
Dummies
Dependent -50.85 34.53 -85.86 57.54 -60.57 61.51 -149.13 85.64 *
High-cost benefit (dropped)
Additional benefit 127.63 27.99 *** 249.16 46.34 *** 230.35 49.62 *** 303.79 67.82 ***
Public expence 48.39 26.33 * 114.88 43.19 *** 138.01 46.34 *** 114.53 63.66 *
Head 78.22 42.34 * 201.85 72.50 *** 129.35 77.63 * 182.26 108.34 *
Dependent 73.08 34.92 ** 131.44 59.32 ** 143.20 63.38 ** 96.83 88.80
Public expence -123.29 87.97 -155.82 164.48 -264.46 188.12 -123.22 221.77
Pseud (or Adusted) R-squared 0.027 0.053 0.056 0.071
Constant 313.86 27.65 *** 418.17 30.83 *** 497.98 44.83 *** 606.86 56.13 ***
Gender (male=1) 41.19 17.83 ** 99.29 19.99 *** 179.94 29.13 *** 171.22 36.22 ***
Dummies
Dependent 16.14 29.42 38.87 33.15 -17.30 48.31 28.81 59.75
High-cost benefit 7572.49 21.21 *** 7424.29 23.50 *** 7255.39 503.42 *** 7132.89 41.82 ***
Additional benefit 168.26 25.93 *** 189.42 29.03 *** 334.69 42.25 *** 302.19 52.28 ***
Public expence 31.81 23.35 48.74 26.18 * 108.15 38.16 *** 91.04 46.57 *
Head -22.05 34.54 62.40 38.59 79.50 56.12 83.14 67.94
Dependent 70.28 28.62 ** 154.91 31.96 *** 166.68 46.48 *** 201.26 58.03 ***
Public expence 141.85 87.00 61.72 96.76 -43.07 145.59 130.57 172.44
Pseud (or Adusted) R-squared 0.037 0.045 0.145 0.064
Note (1): The symbols, ***, ** and *, mean that the estimates are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Note (3):  The estimated parameters of the diagnoses dummies are omitted for ALL SAMPLES. 
THE CAPITATION APPLICABLE (N = 1236)
THE FEE-FOR-SERVICE (N = 1934)
Note (2): The CAPITATION APPLICABLE consists of individuals who have one of the diagnoses for which the capitation is applicable described on their claims both in
the non-beneficiary and in the beneficiary periods, while the FEE-FOR-SERVICE consists  of individuals who had no diagnoses under the capitation scheme..
Cross products ( × beneficiary
dummy)
Cross products ( × beneficiary
dummy)
Cross products ( × beneficiary
dummy)
ALL SAMPLES (N = 3170)
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